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Abstract
Sybil attacks are becoming increasingly widespread, and
pose a significant threat to online social systems; a sin-
gle adversary can inject multiple colluding identities in
the system to compromise security and privacy. Recent
works have leveraged the use of social network-based
trust relationships to defend against Sybil attacks. How-
ever, existing defenses are based on oversimplified as-
sumptions, which do not hold in real world social graphs.
In this work, we propose SybilFrame, a defense-in-
depth framework for mitigating the problem of Sybil at-
tacks when the oversimplified assumptions are relaxed.
Our framework is able to incorporate prior information
about users and edges in the social graph. We vali-
date our framework on synthetic and real world network
topologies, including a large-scale Twitter dataset with
20M nodes and 265M edges, and demonstrate that our
scheme performs an order of magnitude better than pre-
vious structure-based approaches.
1 Introduction
Our systems today are vulnerable to Sybil attacks, in
which an attacker injects multiple fake accounts into the
system to compromise security and privacy [1]. Re-
cently, the increasing popularity of online social net-
works have made them attractive targets for Sybil at-
tacks. It is estimated that tens of millions of Sybil ac-
counts exist in popular social networks such as Twitter
and Facebook [2] [3]. Attackers can leverage Sybil ac-
counts to compromise system security via propagating
social malware, as well as system privacy via learning
users’ private information [2]-[4]
An important thread of research proposes to mitigate
Sybil attacks using social network-based trust relation-
ships. The key insight of this line of defense is that it is
hard for attackers to establish trust relationships with be-
nign users. That is, the number of edges between benign
users and Sybil identities (called attack edges) is limited.
Systems such as SybilGuard [5], SybilLimit [6], Sybil-
Infer [7], SybilRank [8], and SybilBelief [9] exploit the
limited number of attack edges to detect Sybil identities
using graph-theoretic techniques.
While these systems as well as related works have pi-
oneered the use of social network structure for Sybil de-
fense, the actual deployment of these ideas in real world
networks remains controversial. Yang et al. [10] showed
that network structure-based Sybil defenses failed in
identifying Sybil accounts in RenRen, a popular social
network in China. This is because structure-based de-
fense mechanisms make assumptions of strong trust re-
lationships between users, such that the number of at-
tack edges is limited [5]-[9]. These assumptions do not
hold in networks with weak trust relationships, which
enables an adversary to create a large number of attack
edges. Ghosh et al. [11] showed that on Twitter, a link
farming phenomenon is wide spread and poisonous, in
which certain benign accounts blindly accept follow re-
quests. Thus, in such weak-trust social networks, previ-
ous structure-based Sybil defenses have limited applica-
bility and performance.
In this paper, we focus on the problem of mitigating
Sybil attacks in social networks with weak trust, i.e.,
when the number of attack edges is large. We propose
SybilFrame, an approach that provides defense-in-depth
against Sybil attacks. SybilFrame uses a multi-stage
classification mechanism that is able to incorporate het-
erogeneous sources and types of information about the
social network. In the first stage, SybilFrame leverages
fine grained local information about users and edges in
the social network to design classifiers for predicting
whether users or edges are benign or malicious. In the
second stage, SybilFrame combines information from
local classifiers with global structural properties of so-
cial networks (even ones with weak trust properties).
Our approach leverages the results of local classification
about users and edges as prior probabilities in a pairwise
Markov Random Field model [12], and uses Loopy Be-
lief Propagation [13] to make probabilistic inferences.
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We experimentally evaluate the performance of Sybil-
Frame using both synthetic and Facebook network
topologies. We show that local node classifiers that are
better than random (e.g., false positive/negative rates as
high as 40%), can significantly improve the Sybil detec-
tion accuracy when combined with global structural in-
formation. Similarly, local edge classifiers with even a
small predictive capability, provide synergistic informa-
tion to global structural inference, and improve detection
accuracy. Our approach is resilient to seed targeting at-
tacks and a high number of attack edges which are com-
mon in social networks with weak trust.
We test SybilFrame on a large scale Twitter dataset
with over 20M nodes and 265M edges. We obtain in-
formation about which accounts in this dataset were sus-
pended by Twitter, and use this as ground truth for Sybil
attacks. This dataset is typical of social networks with
weak social trust, as the attacker has more than 18M at-
tack edges for about 145,000 Sybil identities. Even in
this challenging setting with very large number of attack
edges, SybilFrame is able to detect 51% Sybil identities
with 4.2% false positives, with an overall accuracy of
95.4%. In contrast, state-of-the-art approaches such as
SybilBelief predict all nodes to be Sybil and thus com-
pletely fail on this dataset. SybilFrame can also be used
as a mechanism to rank user accounts. In the top 1K ac-
counts ranked by SybilFrame (in increasing order of be-
ing benign), SybilFrame identifies 55% Sybil accounts,
which is 1-2 orders of magnitude better than state-of-the-
art approaches. Furthermore, we manually examine the
profile of the top 100 ranked users, of which 71 are sus-
pended and 29 are active, and find that 24 active accounts
are highly likely to be malicious. Thus, SybilFrame is
able to uncover a large fraction (24/29) of suspicious ac-
counts that Twitter fails to detect.
2 Background
First, we give a formal definition of the Sybil defense
problem in online social systems, and discuss state-of-
the-art approaches. Then, we introduce our design goals.
2.1 Sybil Defense in Online Social Systems
Consider a network topology G = (V,E), comprising a
set V of nodes with a set E of edges. In social network
topologies, a node v ∈ V denotes a user on the network,
and an edge (u,v) ∈ E denotes a friendship relationship
between two users u and v. Here we only consider mutual
relationships, hence (u,v) ∈ E is equivalent to (v,u) ∈ E
and G is an undirected graph. Every node v ∈ V in the
network is either a benign node, or a Sybil identity.
Figure 1 depicts the Sybil attack problem. We denote
the subnetwork containing all benign nodes to be the be-
nign region, and denote the subnetwork containing all
Sybil nodes to be the Sybil region. The edges that con-
nect the benign region and the Sybil region are called at-
tack edges. Following the established convention in the
literature, we do not impose any constraints on the size
or the shape of the Sybil region. Attackers can create an
unlimited number of Sybil nodes and set up edges be-
tween them arbitrarily. The main goal of Sybil defense is
to design a mechanism to detect as many Sybil nodes as
possible, while minimizing the number of benign nodes
that are misdetected, i.e., a low false positive rate.
Benign Region Sybil Region
Attack Edges
Figure 1: Sybil attack problem.
2.2 State-of-the-art Approaches
Content-based approaches: Content-based approaches
seek to filter Sybil accounts by analyzing the associ-
ated content information, such as news feeds and wall
posts on Facebook and tweets and hashtags on Twit-
ter [4]. These approaches span a large category of mech-
anisms, including blacklisting, whitelisting, URL filter-
ing, as well as various machine learning methods, such as
Bayesian Reasoning, Support Vector Machines and Clus-
tering [14]-[15]. A major problem of these approaches is
that attackers can mimic the behaviors of benign users
and produce similar content information, thus making
content-based approaches less effective.
Structure-based approaches: Structure-based ap-
proaches, seek to exploit graph-theoretic differences be-
tween benign and Sybil identities. The key insight is that
in a social graph where edges represent strong trust re-
lationships between users, it is hard for attackers to set
up links to benign users. As a result, the number of at-
tack edges is relatively small. Such networks preserve
a strong level of homophily, i.e., two linked nodes are
likely to have similar attributes.
SybilGuard [5] and SybilLimit [6], rely on the insight
that it is easy for short random walks starting from a
benign user to quickly reach other benign users, while
hard for random walks starting from Sybil identities to
enter into the benign region. SybilInfer [7], relies on
random walks and a combination of Bayesian inference
and Monte-Carlo sampling and aims to directly detect
the bottleneck cut between benign and Sybil identities.
SybilRank [8], uses short random walks to distribute
initial scores from a set of trusted benign seeds, and
rely on the insight that benign users tend to have larger
degree-normalized scores than Sybil identities. Crimi-
nal account Inference Algorithm (CIA) [16], similar to
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SybilRank, starts random walks and distributes scores
from Sybil seeded users and allows the restart from ini-
tial probability distribution with certain probability. Re-
searchers have shown that despite considerable differ-
ences, the above schemes rely on identifying local com-
munities around a trust node [17]. SybilBelief [9], on the
other hand, models the distribution of labels of the nodes
as a pairwise Markov Random Field. Similar to Sybil-
Frame, it adopts Loopy Belief Propagation to estimate
probabilities of users being benign. I´ntegro [18], is an ex-
tension to SybilRank by incorporating victim predictions
using content features, thus not purely structure-based.
We note that all of the above-mentioned structure-
based methods are based on two key assumptions. First,
the benign region is fast mixing [19], which presumes the
existence of a well-connected, giant community struc-
ture of benign users. Second, the social network is a
strong trust network, where the number of attack edges is
relatively small [17]. Given the two assumptions, these
structure-based approaches have been shown to provide
reliable performance.
2.3 Assumptions vs. Reality
We claim that the above mentioned assumptions over-
simplify social network structure, and do not hold well
on all real-world social graphs.
First, benign users tend to form multiple small com-
munities [17] driven by different purposes (e.g., geo-
graphical location, education and career). This multi-
community structure prohibits the existence of a giant
community component and hence results in a longer mix-
ing time. Mohaisen et al. [19] measured the mixing time
of real-world social graphs and found that the actual mix-
ing time is longer than the theoretical anticipated value.
Second, real-world social networks may not necessar-
ily represent strong trust networks. Yang et al. showed
that RenRen, the largest social networking platform in
China, does not follow this assumption [10]. Another
typical example is the Twitter network. The Twitter net-
work is a directed network, on which links are estab-
lished by the action of “follow”. Unlike Facebook, users
in Twitter often use a pseudonym, which makes them
less serious about whom they choose to follow. Ghosh et
al. [11] showed that on Twitter, the notable phenomenon
of link farming is wide spread, and that a majority of
attack edges are farmed from a small fraction of Twit-
ter users. Those users, the social capitalists, are benign
users who are seeking to increase their social power and
links by following back anyone who follows them. Even
normal users, who are not as athirst for social power as
social capitalists, are also likely to follow back strangers
because they want to read their tweets or just by cour-
tesy. On such weak trust social networks like Twitter, a
large number of attack edges exist and the benign region
may not be easily separable from the Sybil region. As a
result, all of these structure-based Sybil defense mecha-
nisms are limited in their performance.
2.4 Design Goals
We aim to design a scheme that works even when the
fast-mixing and strong trust assumptions are relaxed.
Our overall design goals are as follows:
1) Defense-in-depth: The scheme should provide
multi-layered protection, and be robust to different attack
strategies.
2) Accuracy: The scheme should have reliable detec-
tion accuracy when applied to a wide range of social net-
work topologies, including both strong trust and weak
trust social networks.
3) Scalability: The scheme should be scalable to large
social networks, and be amenable to parallel deployment.
We propose SybilFrame, a defense-in-depth frame-
work that adopts a multi-stage classification mechanism
for incorporating heterogeneous sources and types of in-
formation about the social network.
3 The SybilFrame Framework
In this section, we give a detailed description of Sybil-
Frame framework.
3.1 Framework Overview
Raw Data
Node Prior
Other 
methods…
Structural 
Information
Crowdsour
cing
Content 
Information
Stage 1
Edge Prior
Prior Info
Loopy Belief 
Propagation
Markov 
Random Field
Stage 2
Node 
Posterior
Posterior Info
Predicted 
Labels
SybilFrame
Node 
Ranking
Figure 2: SybilFrame framework.
Figure 2 shows the general framework of SybilFrame.
SybilFrame is a multi-stage classification approach that
leverages the attributes of an individual node and correla-
tion between connected nodes to make a combined clas-
sification of networked data. SybilFrame has two stages
of inference. Once the raw data has been fed into the
framework, Stage 1 will explore the dataset and extract
useful information, to compute node prior information
and edge prior information (Section 3.2). This prior in-
formation, together with a small set of nodes whose la-
bels are known, i.e., trust seeds, will be fed into Stage 2.
Stage 2 is the posterior inference layer. To represent the
correlation between nodes, we model the problem as a
pairwise Markov Random Field (Section 3.3). We adopt
Loopy Belief Propagation (Section 3.4) to make infer-
ences about the posterior information. This posterior in-
formation will then be used to classify and rank Sybil
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identities (Section 3.5).
3.2 Prior Information
Stage 1 in Figure 2 takes the raw dataset as input, and
outputs the prior information of all nodes and edges. We
now formalize our notion of priors.
For a node v ∈ V , we denote Priorv as the node prior
of v. Priorv is a real number in the range [0,1], that quan-
tifies the probability that node v takes a benign label. The
larger Priorv is, the more likely that v is a benign node.
Specifically, Priorv > 0.5 means that v is more likely to
take a benign label rather than a Sybil label. Similarly,
Priorv < 0.5 means that v is more likely to take a Sybil
label, and Priorv = 0.5 means that v takes a benign or
Sybil label with equal probability. If v’s label is known,
then Priorv = 1 for a benign trust seed, and Priorv = 0
for a Sybil trust seed.
For two nodes u and v that are connected by an
edge, we denote Prioru,v as the edge prior of (u,v) ∈ E.
Prioru,v is a real number in the range [0,1], that quantifies
the likelihood that node u and node v take the same label.
The larger Prioru,v is, the more likely that u and v take
the same label. Specifically, Prioru,v > 0.5 means that u
and v are more likely to take the same label than different
labels. Similarly, Prioru,v < 0.5 means that u and v are
more likely to take different labels, and Prioru,v = 0.5
means that u’s label has no influence on v’s label, and
vice versa. Generally, Prioru,v models the level of cou-
pling strength between u and v. Prioru,v > 0.5 refers to a
positive coupling relationship, and Prioru,v < 0.5 refers
to a negative coupling relationship, and Prioru,v = 0.5
means that there is no coupling between u and v.
The derivation of node priors and edge priors is based
on the dataset we are given. We can leverage hetero-
geneous information sources to make inferences. To
compute node priors, we can leverage the structural in-
formation and explore differences of local structure be-
tween benign and Sybil nodes. We can extract useful fea-
tures and build a machine learning classifier that supports
probability estimates, and use these probability outputs
as node priors. To infer edge priors, we want to assign
lower scores to attack edges, and assign higher scores to
edges between benign accounts. We do not care about
edges between Sybil accounts, since attacker has a com-
plete control over the Sybil region and can change it ar-
bitrarily. This makes our approach robust to high num-
ber of attack edges and distinguishes SybilFrame from
previous approaches. Since benign nodes tend to behave
similarly and Sybil nodes tend to behave differently from
benign nodes, a straightforward way is to explore simi-
larities of two connected nodes under different metrics
and obtain a scaled overall similarity score. This overall
score can then be used as an edge prior.
We note that although we propose a structure-based
scheme, as will be demonstrated and evaluated later, our
framework can definitely incorporate content informa-
tion. For example, we can analyze news feeds of each
Facebook account and tweets of each Twitter account,
and identify spam keywords and abnormal actions. We
can then build a content-based classifier and compute
node priors. The philosophy also works for content-
based edge priors. The reason why we tend to use struc-
tural information is that it is harder for an attacker to alter
the overall graph structure than mimic the content behav-
iors of benign users. In Section 5 and Section 6, we will
explore ways to compute node priors and edge priors on
real-world, large-scale social graphs.
3.3 Markov Random Field
A Markov Random Field (MRF) [12], is a probabilis-
tic graphical model over an undirected graph. Nodes in
MRF are random variables, and edges are used to model
correlation between those random variables. For each
node v ∈ V on graph G = (V,E), we associate it with a
binary random variable Xv, that indicates the label of v.
Xv = 1 refers to a benign label, and Xv = −1 refers to a
Sybil label. To quantify the correlation, we use a set of
functions called clique potentials. A clique potential is
a function defined over a set of random variables, which
maps any joint assignment of these random variables to
a real number, which indicates how favorable this joint
assignment is. Let Ψ denote the set of potential func-
tions. Specifically, if we only consider cliques compris-
ing at most two connected nodes, Ψ can be divided into
the following two types of functions.
ψv(Xv) =
{
Priorv, if Xv = 1
1−Priorv, if Xv =−1
(1)
ψu,v(Xu,Xv) =
{
Prioru,v, if XuXv = 1
1−Prioru,v, if XuXv =−1
(2)
As defined in Section 3.2, Priorv is the prior informa-
tion of node v, and Prioru,v is the prior information of
edge (u,v). We denote function ψv as the node poten-
tial, and function ψu,v as the edge potential. (G,Ψ) then
defines a pairwise Markov Random Field.
Given a pairwise MRF (G,Ψ), where G = (V,E) and
Ψ = (ψv,ψu,v), the full joint probability distribution is
specified as
P(XV ) =
1
Z ∏v∈V
ψv(Xv) ∏
(u,v)∈E
ψu,v(Xu,Xv) (3)
Here, XV denotes a particular joint assignment of all
random variables in set V , and Z is the partition function
given by
Z =∑
XV
∏
v∈V
ψv(Xv) ∏
(u,v)∈E
ψu,v(Xu,Xv) (4)
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3.4 Infer Posteriors
Given the pairwise MRF (G,Ψ), which contains prior in-
formation of trust seeds and other nodes and edges, for
each node v ∈V , we want to infer the posterior probabil-
ity of random variable Xv.
P(Xv) =
1
Z ∑XV\v
∏
s∈V
ψs(Xs) ∏
(u,s)∈E
ψu,s(Xu,Xs) (5)
Exact inference is computationally difficult, and not
scalable on large dataset. Therefore, we adopt Loopy Be-
lief Propagation to make approximate inferences. Loopy
Belief Propagation [13] is an iterative process in which
neighboring variables pass messages or beliefs to each
other. Algorithm 1 gives the Loopy Belief Propagation
algorithm for the pairwise MRF (G,Ψ).
Algorithm 1: Loopy Belief Propagation Algorithm
Data: node potentials ψv(Xv), edge potentials
ψu,v(Xu,Xv)
Result: marginal beliefs belv(Xv)
Initialize beliefs belv(Xv) = 1 for all nodes v
Initialize message mu→v(Xv) = 1 for all edges u→ v
repeat
Messages update mu→v(Xv) =
∑Xu
(
ψu(Xu)ψu,v(Xu,Xv)∏s∈Nbd(u)\v ms→u(Xs)
)
Beliefs update
belv(Xv) ∝ ψv(Xv)∏u∈Nbd(v)mu→v(Xv)
until number of iterations > threshold d
We note that for social networks with loops, LBP ap-
proximates the posterior probability distribution without
theoretical convergence guarantees. However, LBP has
been widely used and demonstrated good results in prac-
tical applications [13]. Through our experiments, we find
that setting d to be 5∼6 achieves good results.
Scalability: The complexity of LBP is O(md) where m
is the number of edges and d is the number of iterations.
For sparse social networks, O(md) = O(nd), where n is
the number of nodes. LBP is essentially parallelizable,
and we will discuss related implementation issues in Sec-
tion 6.5.
3.5 Sybil Accounts Prediction and Rank-
ing
We use posteriors obtained in Section 3.4 to predict the
label of each node. For a node v whose label is unknown,
we predict the label Lv using the following rule.
Lv = sign(belv−0.5) (6)
where Lv = 1 means that v is predicted as a benign node,
and Lv =−1 means that v is predicted as a Sybil node.
We can also rank nodes in ascending order of its pos-
terior, and produce a ranking list. Sybil nodes are likely
to have lower posteriors, thus occur more in the front
part. OSN operators can then go through the list from
the beginning, and check a fixed number of nodes. More
effective posteriors will let OSN operators detect more
Sybil accounts within a certain amount of time.
4 Security Evaluation on Synthetic Net-
works
In this section, we evaluate SybilFrame on different net-
work structures. For comparison, we use SybilBelief [9],
which takes a similar probabilistic inference approach as
SybilFrame. Since Gong et al. [9] have demonstrated
that SybilBelief outperforms other structure-based meth-
ods on trust networks, we limit our space here to only
compare with SybilBelief. Later in Section 5 and Sec-
tion 6, we will compare with other methods such as
SybilLimit [6], SybilInfer [7], and SybilRank [8]. We do
not compare with I´ntegro [18] since it leverages network-
specific content information for victim predictions.
Basic experimental setup: We adopt the Preferential
Attachment (PA) [20] model to generate both benign re-
gion and Sybil region. The size of benign region is 1000,
and the size of Sybil region is 400. The average degree of
both benign region and Sybil region is 10. We randomly
add 1000 attack edges between the two regions. We only
use 1 benign trust seed and 1 Sybil trust seed. For default
node priors, we set 0.9 for benign trust seeds, and 0.1 for
Sybil trust seeds, and 0.5 for others if we do not have any
external priors fed in. For default edge priors, we set it to
0.9 in order to model homophily. We will study the im-
pact of different factors. When we study one factor, we
fix the other factors to be the same as in the basic setup,
and only vary the studied one. Under each setting, we
run 100 experiments. In each experiment, we randomly
generate 1 benign trust seed and 1 Sybil trust seed, con-
figure prior information, and run SybilFrame and Sybil-
Belief. We store results of SybilFrame and SybilBelief
correspondingly, and take the average over 100 experi-
ments in the end to be our final results.
Evaluation metrics: Following the convention, we de-
note Sybil nodes as positive examples and benign nodes
as negative examples. Thus, we have TP (Sybil→ Sybil),
TN (benign → benign), FP (benign → Sybil) and FN
(Sybil→ benign). We use the following four evaluation
metrics:
1) Accuracy: (T P+T N)/(T P+T N+FP+FN)
2) Number of rejected benign nodes: FP
3) Number of accepted Sybil nodes: FN
4) Area Under the Receiver Operating Character-
istic Curve (AUC) [21]: The probability that a randomly
selected benign nodes ranks higher than a randomly se-
lected Sybil node, given the ranking of posteriors of all
nodes from the smallest to the largest.
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Figure 3: Vary FPR=FNR (node prior)
4.1 Influence of Node Priors
We want to explore SybilFrame when only incorporat-
ing external node priors. Since we are experimenting
with synthetic networks, we need to figure out a way to
obtain node priors that are able to model the real case.
A straightforward solution is to use false positive rate
(FPR) and false negative rate (FNR) to model the perfor-
mance of an external node classifier. By setting up differ-
ent FPR and FNR, we can generate prior scores that are
able to model the level of noise, and use them to evaluate
SybilFrame. Due to limited space, we list our Node Prior
Generator algorithm (Algorithm 2) in Appendix 9.1. In
Algorithm 2, we set prior for benign/Sybil trust seeds to
be 0.9/0.1, not 1/0 as discussed in Section 3.2 in order to
run LBP successfully.
Varying FPR and FNR: First, we evaluate SybilFrame
given node priors with different levels of noise. We tune
FPR = FNR from 0 to 0.5, i.e., from perfect classifica-
tion to random guess, and fix everything else as in the
basic setup. In addition to comparison with SybilBelief,
we also compare with the performance of external node
classifier, i.e., compare with priors, and explore whether
there are improvements. Figure 3 shows the results. As
FPR= FNR increases, the performance of external node
classifier degrades linearly. Besides, SybilFrame per-
forms better than SybilBelief when FPR = FNR ≤ 0.4,
in terms of all four metrics. When FPR = FNR ≤ 0.3,
SybilFrame can achieve near optimal performance. This
means that SybilFrame is resilient to prior noise with
FPR and FNR as high as 40%.
Varying the number of attack edges: Second, we
evaluate SybilFrame when the number of attack edges
changes. We set FPR and FNR to be 0.3, and vary the
number of attack edges from 0 to 1000. Figure 4 shows
the results. We find that both SybilFrame and SybilBelief
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Figure 4: Vary the number of attack edges (node prior)
have good performance with less than 200 attack edges.
However, when the number of attack edges increases,
SybilBelief degrades its performance while SybilFrame
still has stable and near optimal detection accuracy.
Varying the size of the Sybil region: Furthermore, we
evaluate SybilFrame when attacker changes the size of
Sybil region. We will not consider the case when the
Sybil region is too small, since it has limited utility to
perform large-scale attacks. We set FPR and FNR to
be 0.3, and vary the size of Sybil region from 400 to
1000. Figure 5 shows the results. When there are more
Sybil nodes, both SybilFrame and SybilBelief improve
performance. This is because when both the benign and
Sybil region are large, the internal homophily is strong
enough to overcome the influence of attack edges. How-
ever, SybilFrame still performs better than SybilBelief.
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Figure 5: Vary the size of Sybil region (node prior)
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Figure 6: Vary FPR=FNR (edge prior)
4.2 Influence of Edge Priors
We want to explore SybilFrame when only incorporat-
ing external edge priors. Similarly, we use FPR and
FNR to model the performance of an external edge clas-
sifier, which makes predictions of attack edges and other
edges. We list our Edge Prior Generator algorithm (Al-
gorithm 3) in Appendix 9.1.
Varying FPR and FNR: First, we tune FPR = FNR
for edge priors from 0 to 0.5. We run SybilFrame with
default node priors and compare with SybilBelief. From
Figure 6, with FPR = FNR≤ 0.3, SybilFrame performs
better than SybilBelief. Figure 16 in Appendix 9.2 shows
the results when we set FPR = 0.1 and tune FNR from
0 to 0.5. As we can see, SybilFrame has good perfor-
mance and outperforms SybilBelief even when FNR is
0.5. This means that as long as the external edge classi-
fier has some power to detect attack edges, incorporating
edge priors into SybilFrame gives better performance.
Varying the number of attack edges: Second, we set
FPR to be 0.1 and FNR to be 0.5, and vary the num-
ber of attack edges from 0 to 1000. Figure 7 shows the
results. As the number of attack edges increases, both
SybilFrame and SybilBelief degrade performance. How-
ever, SybilFrame still outperforms SybilBelief. Notice
that the performance of SybilFrame depends the detec-
tion accuracy of external classifier. If we have a clas-
sifier with 0.1 FPR and 0.1 FNR, SybilFrame will have
near optimal performance.
Varying the size of the Sybil region: Furthermore,
we evaluate SybilFrame with edge priors when attacker
changes the size of the Sybil region. We set FPR to be
0.1 and FNR to be 0.5, and vary the size of Sybil region
from 400 to 1000. From Figure 8, SybilFrame improves
its performance when there are more Sybil nodes, and
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Figure 7: Vary the number of attack edges (edge prior)
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Figure 8: Vary the size of Sybil region (edge prior)
still outperforms SybilBelief.
4.3 Resilient Against Seed Targeting At-
tacks
We are interested in the impact of seed targeting attacks,
i.e., when the known labeled nodes are end points of at-
tack edges. We consider the following cases:
1) SI: Benign (Sybil) trust seeds are not end points of
attack edges.
2) SII: Benign (Sybil) trust seeds are end points of
attack edges.
Figure 9 shows the accuracy as a function of the
number of attack edges for four scenario combina-
tions of trust seeds, in the node prior experiment
(FPR=FNR=0.3) and edge prior experiment (FPR=0.1,
FNR=0.5). We find that the location of trust seeds have
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Figure 9: Accuracy of SybilFrame under seed targeting at-
tacks. (a) Given node priors. (b) Given edge priors.
no influence on the detection accuracy. Due to limited
space, we list the results of AUC, FP and FN in Ap-
pendix 9.3. We find that SybilFrame is resilient against
seed targeting attacks, and we can simply select trust
seeds uniformly at random.
4.4 Summary
In summary, we have the following observations:
1) SybilFrame outputs near optimal results when in-
corporating node priors with FPR and FNR less than 0.3.
2) SybilFrame outperforms SybilBelief when incorpo-
rating node priors with FPR and FNR less than 0.4.
3) When incorporating edge priors, as long as the edge
priors has a low FPR (0.1) and some level of FNR (less
than 0.5), SybilFrame outperforms SybilBelief.
4) SybilFrame is robust to different attack strategies
and resilient against seed targeting attacks.
5 Evaluation on Facebook Network
We evaluate SybilFrame on semi-real Facebook network,
and compare with state-of-the-art Sybil defense mecha-
nisms: SybilLimit, SybilInfer, SybilRank and SybilBe-
lief. We find that SybilFrame performs orders of mag-
nitudes better than other methods, especially when the
number of attack edges is large. Furthermore, the perfor-
mance of SybilFrame is stable and near optimal.
5.1 Dataset Description
The dataset we use is the ego-Facebook dataset obtained
from Stanford Network Analysis Project (SNAP) [22].
The Facebook graph contains 4,039 nodes and 88,234
edges. In this graph, nodes are Facebook accounts and
edges are friendship relationships. The graph is con-
nected and undirected, with a diameter 8 and average
clustering coefficient 0.6055.
5.2 Experimental Setup
We construct the network topology as follows. We use
this Facebook dataset as both the benign region and Sybil
region, and randomly add attack edges between the two
regions. We vary the number of attack edges from 1000
to 20000, and evaluate the performance of SybilFrame,
as well as SybilLimit, SybilInfer, SybilRank and Sybil-
Belief. We randomly select 1 benign trust seed and 1
Sybil trust seed, and perform the experiments 100 times
and then take the average.
5.3 Compute Prior Information
To run SybilFrame, we need prior information. Since the
benign region is identical to the Sybil region, we are not
able to collect distinguishable node priors. Thus, we only
explore ways to compute edge priors.
As discussed in Section 3.2, we can leverage similarity
between two connected nodes, and use it as a prior for the
edge between them. Intuitively, connected benign nodes
are similar and connected benign and Sybil nodes are
not similar. Therefore, attack edges should have a lower
score than non-attack edges. We adopt the Jaccard index
here as a measure of similarity. For an edge (u,v) ∈ E,
the Jaccard index [23] of it is defined as |Γ(u)∩Γ(v)||Γ(u)∪Γ(v)| , where
Γ(u) denotes the set of one-hop neighbors of node u, and
|Γ(u)∩Γ(v)| denotes the number of common neighbors
of u and v. For edges that connect two trust seeds, we set
the prior of it to 0.1 if the edge is an attack edge, and set
to 0.9 if the edge is a non-attack edge. For other edges,
we compute the corresponding Jaccard index. We scale
these indices into the range [0.1,0.9]. These scaled Jac-
card scores will then be used as priors.
We can also use other similarity metrics, such as Co-
sine index [24] or Adamic-Adar index [23] , and combine
them to obtain an overall similarity score. A possible ap-
proach is to use these raw similarity scores as features
for an edge, and obtain a feature matrix for all edges
on the graph. We can then adopt a supervised learning
approach by leveraging existing tools, such as Logistic
Regression [25] and Support Vector Machine [25], and
make probabilistic predictions of each edge being a non-
attack/attack edge. These probabilistic outputs can then
be used as overall prior scores.
5.4 Results
Figure 10 shows the performance of SybilFrame and
other Sybil defense mechanisms as we vary the number
of attack edges from 1000 to 20000. Since SybilRank
is a ranking scheme and it is very hard to directly use
the degree normalized scores to make predictions, we
only compare with SybilRank in terms of AUC. Also,
since SybilLimit and SybilInfer output binary predictions
rather than belief scores, we do not include them into
AUC comparison. We find that: 1) As the number of at-
tack edges increases, the performance of precious meth-
ods degrades, with a lower accuracy (SybilLimit, Sybil-
Infer, SybilBelief), and lower AUC (SybilRank). 2) The
speed of performance degradation is fast. With more than
3000 attack edges, the detection accuracy of SybilBelief
is less than 0.5, worse than a random guess, and Sybil-
Limit and SybilInfer predict all Sybil nodes to be benign,
thus losing the detection capability. Thus, SybilBelief,
SybilLimit and SybilInfer do not work on weak trust net-
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Figure 10: Performance comparison on Facebook network
works with a large number of attack edges. 3) The per-
formance of SybilFrame is stable and near optimal in all
cases. By incorporating edge prior information, Sybil-
Frame is able to restrict the amount of message passing
across the attack edges. Thus, SybilFrame is able to suc-
cessfully handle the situation when the number of attack
edges is large, and performs orders of magnitudes better
than other approaches.
6 Evaluation on Real-World Large-Scale
Twitter Network
In this section, we will evaluate SybilFrame on real-
world large-scale Twitter network comprising over 20M
nodes and 256M edges. We will explore ways to com-
pute prior information, and incorporate it to SybilFrame.
6.1 Collecting Twitter Dataset
We obtained a snapshot of the Twitter follower network
which was crawled by Kwak et al. [26].
Pre-processing: Originally, the Twitter network is di-
rected. Since it is easy for attackers to manipulate one-
way directed edges, we transform this directed network
to an undirected one by retaining an undirected edge
between u and v if both directed edges (u,v) and (v,u)
exist. Furthermore, we select the largest connected com-
ponent of the transformed network since all investigated
algorithms require the networks to be connected. The
largest connected component contains 21,297,772 nodes,
and 265,025,545 edges, with average degree 24.9.
We note that some previous works remove nodes with
degrees smaller than a threshold from the social net-
works. For instance, SybilLimit [6] removes nodes
with degree smaller than 5 and SybilInfer [7] removes
nodes with degree smaller than 3. Mohaisen et al. [19]
found that such pre-processing will prune a large por-
tion of nodes. Indeed, social networks often have a
long-tail degree distribution (e.g., power-law degree dis-
tribution [27] and lognormal degree distribution [28]),
in which most nodes have very small degrees. Thus, a
large portion of nodes are pruned by such pre-processing.
Such pre-processing could result in high FPR or high
FNR depending on how the OSN operator treats the
pruned nodes. If the OSN operator treats all the pruned
nodes whose degrees are smaller than a threshold as be-
nign nodes, then an attacker can create many malicious
nodes with degree smaller than the threshold, resulting
in high FNR, otherwise a large fraction of benign nodes
will be treated as malicious nodes, resulting in high FPR.
Therefore, we do not perform such pre-processing to the
Twitter network.
Collecting ground truth: To evaluate the approaches,
we need ground truth for the nodes in the Twitter net-
work. The collected Twitter network includes users’
Twitter IDs. Therefore, we re-crawled every account
using Twitter’s API, which tells us the status (i.e., ac-
tive, suspended or deleted) of each account. In summary,
we found that 145,156 nodes (i.e., 0.7%) are suspended,
1,911,482 nodes (i.e., 9.0%) are deleted, and the rest of
the nodes are still active. We take the suspended accounts
as Sybil nodes and the active ones as benign nodes.
6.2 Measuring Twitter Structure
We find that: 1) Many Sybil nodes are isolated from other
Sybils. 2) The number of attack edges is very large. This
means that using existing structure-based Sybil detection
approaches will achieve limited performance.
No community structure: We adopt modularity [29],
ranging from -0.5 to 1, to quantify if a partition of a net-
work (i.e., the partition in our case consists of the benign
and Sybil regions in the Twitter network) can be viewed
as two communities. Clauset et al. [30] concluded, via a
large amount of empirical experiments on real networks,
modularity > 0.3 indicates significant community struc-
ture. However, we find that the partition consisting of
the benign and malicious regions only has modularity
0.0042. Thus, the benign and Sybil regions cannot be
viewed as two separate communities. Next, we show two
reasons: half of the Sybil nodes are isolated and the num-
ber of attack edges per Sybil node is high.
1) Half of the Sybil accounts are isolated: In to-
tal, we find 77,917 connected components in the Sybil
region (i.e., the subgraph including all malicious nodes
and edges between them). Figure 11 shows the distribu-
tion of sizes of these components. First, around 50% of
Sybil nodes are isolated, i.e., they only link to benign
nodes. Second, we find that there exists a large con-
nected component including 45% of all malicious nodes.
Specifically, this component consists of 65,579 nodes
and 931,287 edges, resulting in an average degree of
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Figure 12: CDFs for a) benign and b) Sybil nodes
28.40. Thus, the large component is even denser than the
benign region whose average degree is 21.62. We might
wonder if this large connected component can be viewed
as a community. However, we find that the modularity
of the partition consisting of the benign region and the
largest connected component is still only 0.0046, which
means that even this large connected component cannot
be viewed as a community. Third, the rest of nodes are
in connected components whose sizes are less than 20.
2) Large number of attack edges: We observe that
there are 18,414,469 attack edges, which means each
Sybil node successfully attacks around 127 benign nodes
on average. Figure 12 further characterizes how attack
edges are distributed among the benign and malicious re-
gions. We can draw several conclusions from this figure.
First, the benign and Sybil regions are structurally
similar. Specifically, the number of all neighbors of
both benign and Sybil nodes follow long-tail distribu-
tions. In fact, such long-tail distributions are also widely
observed in other OSNs such as LiveJournal [31] and
Google+ [28]. We speculate that Sybil nodes are imi-
tating the benign region to evade automatic detection.
Second, from Figure 12a, we find that around 90% of
benign nodes are not connected to any Sybil node. More-
over, the number of Sybil neighbors of benign nodes also
follows a long-tail distribution. This implies that, al-
though around 10% of benign nodes link to malicious
nodes, most attack edges concentrate on a smaller num-
ber of benign nodes. For instance, we find that 90% of
attack edges concentrate on only 3% of benign nodes.
90% 10%
3%
5%
Benign region (18.5M) Sybil region (0.15M)
Highlights
1) 90% benign nodes have no attack edges.
2) 3% benign nodes have 90% attack edges.
3) 50% Sybil nodes are isolated.
4) 2% Sybil nodes have no attack edges
5) 16% Sybil nodes have 90% attack edges
Attack edges (18M)
45%16%
90%
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Figure 13: Structure of Twitter network
We speculate that such nodes are celebrities that tend to
follow back to any user who follows them.
Third, from Figure 12b, we observe that around 2%
of Sybil nodes do not link to any benign node. Again,
the number of benign neighbors of Sybil nodes follows
a long-tail distribution, which implies that most attack
edges are produced by a small portion of Sybil nodes.
For instance, we find that 90% of attack edges are pro-
duced by only 16% of Sybil nodes.
Note that the structural properties (i.e., many Sybil
nodes are isolated and there are a large number of attack
edges per Sybil node) of the Sybil nodes in our Twitter
dataset match those in another large-scale Twitter net-
work [11] and those in the RenRen social network [10],
which indicates the representativeness of our observa-
tions. Figure 13 gives a snapshot of the structure.
Summary: We observe that the reason why structure-
based Sybil detection approaches fail is that the assump-
tions they require are not satisfied. Specifically, the be-
nign and Sybil regions cannot be viewed as two separate
communities. One reason is that a significant portion of
the Sybil nodes are isolated, and the other reason is that
the number of attack edges per Sybil node is high.
6.3 Computing Node Priors
We now discuss ways to compute node priors. The idea is
to collect features and train a classifier that outputs prob-
abilistic scores. Since we do not know whether deleted
accounts are benign or Sybil, we will not include them in
the training, prediction and evaluation process. We just
set the priors for them to be 0.5.
6.3.1 Collecting node features
We compute the following three features. We compute
Feature 1) and 2) for all nodes on the original directed
network, and map to the corresponding nodes on the
undirected largest connected component. We directly
compute Feature 3) on the undirected topology.
1) Incoming requests accepted ratio: The insight is
that a Sybil identity is more likely to accept incoming re-
quests than benign users, in order to quickly propagate
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Figure 14: Analysis of the node features.
spam. Hence on average, Sybil identities shall have a
higher incoming requests accepted ratio. Since we only
have structural information, we decide to use the incom-
ing and outgoing edges associated with a node to model
the ratio. For a node v on the original directed Twitter
graph, we denote Γin(v) as the set of all incoming edges
of v, and denote Γout(v) as the set of all outgoing edges
of v. Hence Γin(v)∩Γout(v) is the set of edges that are
both incoming and outgoing edges of v. The incoming
requests accepted ratio is modeled as
Reqin =
|Γin(v)∩Γout(v)|
|Γin(v)| (7)
where |Γ(v)| denotes the cardinality of the set Γ(v).
2) Outgoing requests accepted ratio: The insight is
that a benign user is more reliable and hence the out-
going friend requests send from him/her are more likely
to be accepted. Hence on average, benign users have a
higher outgoing requests accepted ratio than Sybil identi-
ties. Similarly, we model the outgoing requests accepted
ratio for a node v as
Reqout =
|Γin(v)∩Γout(v)|
|Γout(v)| (8)
where |Γ(v)| denotes the cardinality of the set Γ(v).
3) Clustering coefficient: The clustering coefficient
for a vertex is a graph metric that measures how close its
neighbors are to being a complete graph. For a node v
on the undirected graph G = (V,E), its local clustering
coefficient [28] is given as.
C =
2 |{(i, j) : i, j ∈V,(i, j) ∈ E}|
kv(kv−1) (9)
where kv is the degree of v, i and j are both friends of
v. The insight is that benign users tend to have well-
connected social cliques, and users in such cliques share
some attributes in common and are likely to be friends
themselves. Therefore, benign users are likely to have a
higher clustering coefficient than Sybil identities.
Figure 14 shows the scatter plot of the outgoing re-
quests accepted ratio versus incoming requests accepted
ratio, as well as the CDF plot for the clustering coeffi-
cient for benign nodes and Sybil nodes. As expected,
benign users tend to have a higher outgoing requests ac-
cepted ratio, a lower incoming requests accepted ratio,
and a higher coefficient. Besides, only using any one of
the three features is not able to obtain a clear decision
boundary for the classification. Therefore, we need to
leverage these three features together by building a ma-
chine learning classifier.
6.3.2 Training a SVM classifier
We adopt the LIBSVM [32] tool to build a Support Vector
Machine (SVM) [25] classifier. We sample a training set
comprising 10,000 benign nodes and 10,000 Sybil nodes,
and use the remaining nodes as testing. We train a SVM
classifier with RBF kernel, whose parameters c and γ are
obtained from Grid Search. The overall prediction accu-
racy is 90.5%, with 9.4% FPR and 31.8% FNR. Consid-
ering the fact that half of Sybil nodes are isolated, it is
essentially hard for previous approaches to detect more
than half of total Sybil nodes. Thus, the 68.2% Sybil
nodes detection capability of SybilFrame is impressive.
Some applications may require a lower FPR. A natural
way is to assign a higher penalty term to the benign class
and a lower penalty term to Sybil class. In this way, we
can reduce the FPR of our node classifier to be 8.5% with
41.6% FNR.
6.3.3 Output node priors
To output priors, LIBSVM has an internal scheme to al-
low for probability estimates by fitting a logistic curve
and conducting a cross validation procedure [32]. We
can use the same parameters obtained from grid search,
and enable the probability outputs. These output scores
are then used as node priors for SybilFrame.
6.4 Computing Edge Priors
We now explore ways to compute edge priors. As dis-
cussed in Section 5.3, we can leverage well-known sim-
ilarity metrics. For each edge (u,v) ∈ E on graph G =
(V,E), we compute the following similarity metrics:
Number of Common Neighbors [23] Suv =
|Γ(u)∩Γ(v)|
Cosine Similarity Index [24] Suv = |Γ(u)∩Γ(v)|√kukv
Jaccard Similarity Index [23] Suv = |Γ(u)∩Γ(v)||Γ(u)∪Γ(v)|
Adamic-Adar Similarity Index [23] Suv =
∑s∈Γ(u)∩Γ(v) 1ks .
Following a similar procedure, we scale the features
and train a RBF-SVM classifier. As a result, we can suc-
cessfully detect 18% attack edges, with FPR 10%. To
improve the performance, we may include more com-
plex similarity metrics, i.e. Katz Index [24] and Leicht-
Holme-Newman Index [24], which may cost a longer
time to compute. Another way is to use node priors to in-
fer edge priors. Generally, for an edge whose end nodes
have different predicted labels, we can assign a lower
score to indicate a higher possibility to be an attack edge;
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otherwise, we set the score to be default 0.9 to model ho-
mophily. Since our node priors work much better than
edge priors, we adopt this inference procedure.
6.5 Scalable Implementation
We adopt the GraphLab parallel framework [33] to im-
plement Loopy Belief Propagation in parallel. The par-
allel framework distributes nodes to multiple processors,
and each processor passes and updates messages for the
nodes that are assigned to. Essentially, computing node
priors and edge priors is also parallelizable.
6.6 Results
We now present our experimental results. We compare
SybilFrame with SybilBelief in terms of detection accu-
racy, FPR and FNR. We compare with SybilBelief and
SybilRank in terms of relative ranking of Sybil nodes. If
Sybil nodes tend to rank before benign nodes, OSN oper-
ators can leverage crowdsourcing (i.e. Amazon Mechan-
ical Turks [34]) to manually screen and label suspicious
accounts. Since SybilLimit and SybilInfer do not scale
to large datasets, we do not compare with them.
Detection results: We randomly select 1000 benign and
Sybil seeds, and run SybilBelief and SybilFrame. Table 1
shows the results. We draw several conclusions: 1) Due
to large number of attack edges, SybilBelief predicts all
nodes to be Sybil thus completely losing detection ca-
pabilities. (We validated the implementation and results
with the authors of SybilBelief.) 2) Node prior classifier
of SybilFrame has certain detection power, which is able
to detect 68.2% Sybil nodes at maximum. By assign-
ing different penalty terms, the FPR can be reduced to
8.5% (Node classifier - II). 3) Incorporating node priors
into SybilFrame can reduce FPR to 4.2%. (SybilFrame
- II), and achieve a better accuracy 95.4%. 4) Since we
label our ground truth based on whether the accounts are
suspended by Twitter, it is possible that Twitter fails to
detect some Sybil accounts, which are labeled by Sybil-
Frame as positive examples. Thus, the true FPR should
be lower than our estimates. 5) Considering that half
of Sybil nodes are isolated, the detection capability of
68.2% Sybil accounts is impressive.
Table 1: Detection Performance on Twitter
Accuracy FPR FNR
SybilBelief 0.7% 99.3% 0.00
Node classifier 90.5% 9.4% 31.8%
SybilFrame 91.8% 8.0% 33.5%
Node classifier - II 91.2% 8.5% 41.6%
SybilFrame - II 95.4% 4.2% 48.9%
Ranking results: We rank the posteriors score gener-
ated from SybilFrame, as well as scores of SybilBelief
and SybilRank, in ascending order. We then compute the
portion of Sybil identities in the 1K, 10K, 50K, 100K,
1M and 10M lowest-ranked users. Figure 15 shows
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Figure 15: Portion of Sybil identities
the results of four schemes: random guess, SybilRank,
SybilBelief and SybilFrame. We draw several conclu-
sions: 1) In the first 1K users, SybilFrame is able to rank
over 500 Sybil accounts, 12 times better than SybilBe-
lief, 35 times better than SybilRank and 72 times better
than random guess. 2) There exists a significant descend-
ing trend of portions in SybilFrame, while SybilRank
and SybilBelief do not have such trend. This means that
SybilFrame has much more power to rank Sybil nodes
in the top part of the ranking list, while SybilRank and
SybilBelief roughly distribute the Sybil accounts evenly.
3) Given the same amount of time and human resource,
OSN operators can use SybilFrame to detect more Sybil
nodes than using SybilRank or SybilBelief.
Problem with Twitter’s detection policy: Recall that
we obtained our ground truth based on whether the ac-
count was active or suspended by Twitter. Thus, it is
possible that some accounts are actually Sybil but evade
Twitter’s detection policy. To test this, first we re-crawl
the top 1K accounts, and find that 7 additional accounts
have been suspended by Twitter since our first crawl.
Next, we manually examine the top 100 accounts, of
which 71 are suspended and 29 are active. We examine
the profile of each of the 29 active accounts, and find that
only 3 accounts are likely to be real, with a long time-
line and diverse tweets. Besides, 24 accounts are highly
likely to be fake, with common characteristics such as
same account images and few tweets. Furthermore, most
of their tweets are published around 7/5/2009, and they
all contain URLs and are about making money. Thus, we
suspect that these 24 accounts were created by attackers
and belong to the Sybil category. The remaining 2 ac-
counts have less than two tweets and a protected profile,
which are marked as suspicious. We give a complete list
of these 29 active accounts in Appendix 9.4.
From the above analysis, we conclude that: 1) Twit-
ter’s Sybil detection policy is not optimal. 2) SybilFrame
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is able to uncover a large fraction (24/29) of suspicious
accounts that Twitter fails to detect. Hence, the true FPR
of SybilFrame should be lower than our estimates.
6.7 Summary
In this section, we discussed ways to compute priors
and implemented SybilFrame in parallel. We evaluated
SybilFrame on real-world, large-scale Twitter network,
and have following observations:
1) In terms of detection performance, SybilFrame per-
forms orders of magnitudes better than SybilBelief. Even
when the dataset is noisy and the number of attack
edges is large, SybilFrame can detect 68.2% Sybil nodes
at maximum. By tuning parameters, SybilFrame can
achieve 4.2% FPR with 51% detection rate.
2) In terms of ranking performance, SybilFrame per-
forms orders of magnitudes better than SybilBelief and
SybilRank. Among the first 1K users, SybilFrame is able
to successfully rank 552 Sybil accounts, 12 times better
than SybilBelief and 35 times better than SybilRank.
3) SybilFrame is able to uncover large fraction of sus-
picious accounts that Twitter fails to detect.
7 Discussion
Defense-in-depth: We discuss the resilience of our ap-
proach to attackers that aim to mimic the features we use
in Stage 1. Specifically for Twitter experiment, if the at-
tacker wants to mimic the features and let more Sybils
bypass the node classifier, he/she needs to control Sybil
identities to establish more connections between them-
selves and form Sybil clusters, in order to have a lower
Reqin, a higher Reqout and a higher clustering coefficient.
As a result, Sybils will be much more densely connected,
and the edge classifier in Stage 1 together with LBP in
Stage 2 will be more effective to detect them. This is
the basic idea of SybilFrame’s multi-layered protection
and defense-in-depth. Also, it remains to be discussed
whether the attacker wants to spend time in performing
such a complex strategy, which consumes both a lot of
time and resource. In our Twitter experiment, we found
that Sybil identities were often less intelligent (e.g. half
of them are isolated and they share common character-
istics as discussed in Section 6.6), which makes it very
easy for a human expert to identify them. However, Twit-
ters fails to detect a significant fraction of Sybils but
SybilFrame is able to uncover them.
Furthermore, we recall that although we collected
structural features only to evaluate SybilFrame, Sybil-
Frame is an open framework that is able to incorporate
content information. Similarly, we can extract content
features of each node and edge, and build a content-based
classifier, or even combine structural and content features
together to build a more powerful general classifier.
Lower FPR: Our experiment considers suspended ac-
counts in Twitter as a ground truth for Sybil identities.
Correspondingly, accounts that were not suspended were
labeled as benign accounts. We note that this evaluation
is conservative: our analysis considers accounts that are
labeled as malicious by SybilFrame, but not suspended
by Twitter as false positives. It is very well possible that
these labeled false positives are actually malicious, how-
ever not detected by Twitter. As experimented in Sec-
tion 6.6, Twitter’s current detection policy is far from op-
timal, and there is a large fraction of malicious accounts
that Twitter fails to suspend. Therefore, our 4.2% FPR
should be essentially lowered.
Sybil detection capability in Twitter: Recall that
SybilFrame was able to detect 66.5% Sybil identities (Ta-
ble 1, SybilFrame). By tuning parameters, SybilFrame
was able to reduce FPR to 4.2% while still detecting 51%
Sybil identities (Table 1, SybilFrame - II). We believe
that this result is close to the optimal that any structure-
based approach could achieve. On the Twitter graph, half
of the Sybil identities form a connected component, and
the remaining half are isolated and only connect to be-
nign nodes. Since previous structure-based approaches
are mostly based on detecting local communities, they
are limited in their ability to detect those isolated Sybil
nodes.
Resilience against social churn: [35] proposed that ex-
isting Sybil defenses such as SybilInfer [7] and Sybil-
Rank [8] are vulnerable to the churn in social graphs,
in which the attacker gradually moves the attack edges
closer to the trusted seeds. The success of these tempo-
ral attacks requires that the locaiton of the trusted seeds
is known to the attacker and remains steady for a cer-
tain period of time. Unlike other Sybil defenses, Sybil-
Frame does not propagate from trusted seeds. Instead,
SybilFuse computes local scores via local classifiers and
propagate these scores for all nodes. This mechanism is
able to mitigate such temporal attacks since the attacker
does not have a direction for moving the attack edges
gradually. Nevertheless, we recommend that the system
operator frequently change the trusted seeds and rerun
the propagation.
Broader applicability: Our approach of defense-in-
depth, and using a multi-stage classification framework
that is able to incorporate prior information about nodes
and edges has broad applicability for network security.
For example, the area of botnet detection can benefit
from similar techniques that combine host-level informa-
tion with network structure-based information.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed SybilFrame, a defense-in-
depth framework, for structure-based Sybil detection in
online social systems. SybilFrame uses a multi-stage
classification mechanism, which is able to incorporate
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heterogeneous sources and types of information about
the social network. By leveraging the fine grained lo-
cal information about users and edges, SybilFrame trans-
forms local information into beliefs of labels, and then
propagate those beliefs to make collective inferences.
We experimentally evaluated the accuracy of our ap-
proach using both synthetic and real-world social net-
work topologies. We evaluated SybilFrame on a large-
scale Twitter dataset. Our results demonstrate that Sybil-
Frame is resilient to high number of attack edges, and
performs an order of magnitude better than previous
structure-based approaches.
Future work includes collecting and incorporating lo-
cal content information, and enforcing more fine grained
control on the belief propagation rules.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Prior Generator
Node prior generator: Algorithm 2 gives our Node
Prior Generator for experiments on synthetic graphs in
Section 4.1. We randomly generate node priors based on
FPR and FNR.
Edge prior generator: Algorithm 3 gives our Edge
Prior Generator for experiments on synthetic graphs in
Section 4.2. We randomly generate edge priors based on
FPR and FNR.
9.2 Experiments on the Influence of Edge
Priors
As in Section 4.2, we set FPR = 0.1 and tune FNR from
0 to 0.5, and fix everything else in the basic setup. Fig-
ure 16 shows the results of SybilFrame and SybilBelief.
We can see that SybilFrame has good performance and
outperforms SybilBelief even when FNR is 0.5.
Algorithm 2: Node Prior Generator
Data: nodes with true labels, set of trust seeds, FPR
and FNR
Result: priors of all nodes
for each node do
if v is a benign trust seed then set Priorv = 0.9
else if v is a Sybil trust seed then set
Priorv = 0.1
else
if the true label of v is benign then
i = randDouble(0,1)
if i < FPR then
Priorv = randDouble(0.1,0.5)
else
Priorv = randDouble(0.5,0.9)
else
i = randDouble(0,1)
if i < FNR then
Priorv = randDouble(0.5,0.9)
else
Priorv = randDouble(0.1,0.5)
Algorithm 3: Edge Prior Generator
Data: nodes with true labels, set of trust seeds, FPR
and FNR
Result: priors of all edges
for each edge (u,v) do
if both u and v are trust seeds then
if u and v have different labels then
Set Prioru,v = 0.1
else
Set Prioru,v = 0.9
else
if u and v have different labels then
i = randDouble(0,1)
if i < FNR then
Priorv = randDouble(0.5,0.9)
else
Priorv = randDouble(0.1,0.5)
else
i = randDouble(0,1)
if i < FPR then
Priorv = randDouble(0.1,0.5)
else
Priorv = randDouble(0.5,0.9)
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Figure 16: Set FPR=0.1 and vary FNR (edge prior)
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Figure 17: AUC of SybilFrame under seed targeting attacks.
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Figure 18: Performance of SybilFrame under seed targeting
attacks.
9.3 Experiments on Seed Targeting At-
tacks
As in Section 4.3, we evaluate SybilFrame under seed
targeting attacks. Figure 17 shows the AUC as a func-
tion of the number of attack edges for four scenario com-
binations of trust seeds, in the node prior experiment
(FPR=FNR=0.3) and edge prior experiment (FPR=0.1,
FNR=0.5). Figure 18 shows results for the number of
rejected benign nodes and the number of accepted Sybil
nodes.
9.4 Complete List of 29 Active Accounts
Table 2 gives a complete list of 29 active accounts among
the top 100 ranked accounts. For simplicity, we use
pseudo names for account images; accounts sharing the
same image name have the same account image. We have
the following observations:
1) Among 29 active accounts, 3 are benign users, 2 are
suspicious and 24 are Sybil identities.
2) Benign users tend to have a long timeline with di-
verse tweets.
3) Sybil identities have much more following users
than their followers. Besides, Sybil identities have few
tweets (e.g. mostly less than 5) and a short timeline (e.g.
around 7/5/09). Most of their tweets are about making
money and contain URLs. Furthermore, Sybil identities
tend to share common account images.
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